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1. Introduction 
Seemingly innocuous and subtle changes to the formulation and packaging of products may lead to 
significant changes in consumption behavior (French, Story, and Jeffery, 2001; Geier, Rozin, and 
Doros, 2006). Simply doubling the portion size of a food offering, for example, can increase 
consumption by as much as 35%, and this effect is even present for less palatable foods (Wansink, 
1996; Zlatevska, Dubelaar, and Holden, 2014). Although these issues have been explored widely for 
food consumption decisions, they have received far less scrutiny in other contexts. Notwithstanding, 
products ranging from detergents, to medications, to various pesticides are subtly differentiated, and 
companies often change how such products are packaged, formulated, and presented. The 
concentration level of a product may be particularly important. Anecdotal evidence points to dosing 
confusion for concentrated detergents (Consumer Reports, 2012), and survey evidence suggests that 
acetaminophen label confusion can unintentionally lead to overdosing (King et al., 2011; Wolf et al., 
2012). Despite its importance, there is little research into how concentration levels affect product 
usage. 
 The effects of product concentration, and product modifications in general, have received 
even less attention in a production context. This is partly due to the widespread belief, based on 
“natural selection” arguments (e.g., Friedman, 1953), that market competition disciplines firms’ 
choices by fostering profit maximization. With respect to the narrower question of whether product 
formulation impacts users’ choices, production inputs tend to be more standardized and uniform than 
consumer goods, suggesting less scope for behavioral effects. Nonetheless, there are many situations 
in which behavioral biases at the firm level can emerge. However, empirical evidence has mostly 
come from laboratory or field experiments (Armstrong and Huck, 2010; Hanna, Mullainathan, 
Schwartzstein, 2014). Documenting the presence of such effects in real-world markets can have 
significant implications for efficiency and the distribution of economic surplus, as well as for 
regulatory policies intended to address external effects of usage decisions. 
 In this paper we present empirical evidence on how changes in the formulation of glyphosate 
products (increased concentration of its key ingredient) impacted U.S. corn and soybean farmers’ 
glyphosate usage behavior. Glyphosate, known to many by its original commercial name of 
Roundup®, is the most widely applied herbicide in the world, largely due to the widespread diffusion 
of genetically engineered glyphosate tolerant crops (Perry et al. 2016b). Prior to the year 2000, the U.S. 
glyphosate market was highly standardized. Virtually all farmers purchased the same glyphosate 
formulation: Monsanto’s Roundup®, which contained 3 lb/gal of the acid glyphosate in the form of 
2 
 
an isopropalymine salt. The standard recommended dose for a single application of glyphosate was 
0.75 lb/acre. To achieve this rate, the traditional 3 lb/gal product needed to be applied at the rate of 
32 fl oz/acre, and indeed this is the rate that the majority of farmers used. 
Monsanto’s glyphosate patent expired in 2000. Subsequent years saw a large number of new 
products gradually enter the market. While these new products differed in multiple dimensions, the 
most significant source of differentiation was the concentration level of the acid glyphosate. Instead 
of containing the typical 3 lb/gal, some new products had higher concentration levels (e.g., 3.7, 4, and 
4.5 lb/gal). As such, the recommended standard dose—the dose required to achieve the standard field 
rate of 0.75 lb/acre—was lowered on the labels of higher concentration products. As agricultural 
producers adopted higher concentration products, however, a strong pattern emerged: many were 
applying them at the pre-patent expiration standard rate of 32 fl oz/acre. The impact on glyphosate 
use was substantial. Whereas the mean application rate for glyphosate had been flat for several years 
at about 0.73 lb/acre, between 2002 and 2011 it rose to 0.89 lb/acre, a 22% increase. This begs the 
question of why farmers chose 32 oz/acre so frequently with higher concentration products. Was it 
due to farmers’ complete unawareness that newer products contained more glyphosate? Or were 
individuals aware that new products differed, but consciously chose not to adapt to the new rate and 
instead relied on habit or rule of thumb, strategies that have long been noted as characteristic of 
changing and complex decision environments (Simon, 1959; Wood and Neal, 2009)?  
A recent and briskly expanding literature has identified a wide range of situations in which 
individuals do not use information that would help them make better decisions. For instance, bad 
decision-making has been documented in the realms of personal finance, health insurance, and non-
prescription drug choice (Handel and Schwartzstein, 2018). These outcomes may arise in part because 
an inherently difficult choice is made in a distracting and/or confusing environment (Campbell et al., 
2011; Campbell, 2016; Agarwal, Ben-David and Yao, 2017). More generally, failure to make use of 
valuable information appears to stem from two sources (Handel and Schwartzstein, 2018): frictions 
such as rational inattention or search costs (Sims, 2003; Matejka and McKay, 2014); and, mental gaps 
such as an incorrect model of the world. Both factors may have played a role in U.S. farmers’ 
glyphosate application rate choices. The rapid changes in products and formulations that followed the 
glyphosate patent expiration certainly led to the sort of confusion and uncertainty that could generate 
heuristic behavior. A cursory search on the worldwide web, for example, reveals a high level of 
confusion about how to apply new glyphosate products: numerous university extension education 
webpages have been written to address the differences in concentrations, surfactants, salts, and 
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conversion rates (Nordby and Hager, 2004; Sprague, 2006; Armstrong and Lancaster, undated). 
Indeed, the nature of pesticide application, in general, could be characterized as complex and often 
confusing. The pesticide market consists of a large number of subtly differentiated products that come 
with label instructions sometimes exceeding 50 pages in length. Recently, herbicide label complexity 
has been cited as a source of confusion by farmers who apply Dicamba herbicide to newly-released 
Dicamba resistant soybeans (Polansek and Plume, 2017). 
 Whereas the data we use do not permit identification of the relative influence of each 
behavioral mechanism—e.g., frictions versus mental gaps, or which type of frictions—it does permit 
a systematic exploration into whether different concentration levels impacted application rates, as well 
as whether farmers made use of available label information. There are, however, several challenges to 
studying the relationship between glyphosate concentration levels and dosing choices. During the 
same time that new glyphosate products were being adopted and applied, other important events were 
occurring: glyphosate prices were falling, commodity prices were rising, and some farmers were 
experiencing weed resistance to glyphosate. Our ability to identify whether higher product 
concentration levels led to higher application rates, therefore, depends crucially on controlling for 
other, possibly correlated, factors. Given these issues, in this paper we take a three-pronged approach 
to exploring the relationship between glyphosate concentration levels and application rates.  
 First, using a rich farm-level dataset on pesticide use during the 1998-2011 period, we estimate 
the extent to which observed glyphosate application rates change with the product concentration level 
while controlling for prices, unobserved farm-level heterogeneity, and several other potentially 
confounding factors. Importantly, we include both farm- and year-specific fixed effects. We find that 
there is a robust and large positive effect of glyphosate concentration levels on the application rate.  
The initial estimate we obtain for the concentration effect is subject to certain limitations. One 
drawback is that we cannot control for all individual and time-varying factors that affect application 
rates. If such factors were correlated with the choice of which concentration to use, then the model 
estimates may be biased. For example, when a farmer needs to spray at high rates because of inordinate 
weed pressure, they may save on storage and transportation costs by using a smaller quantity of more 
concentrated product. Without controlling explicitly for weed pressure, the coefficient of interest may 
be biased upwards. More generally, a farmer’s choice of which concentration to purchase may be a 
function of the dosing rate they intend to use. Several robustness checks address these concerns, but 
some potential biases may persist. Thus, the next two stages of our analysis explore the data in 
alternative ways that avoid many of these limitations. 
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As noted, the most frequently chosen application rate for more concentrated products is 32 
fluid oz/acre, the pre-patent-expiration “usual” rate. This is despite the fact that 32 oz/ acre is not 
explicitly recommended on the labels of these products. The second stage of our analysis, therefore, 
consists of estimating whether certain farmer characteristics were correlated with the choice of 32 
oz/acre. We also consider the relationship between these same factors and the use of the 
(recommended) standard 0.75 lb/acre rate, which requires knowledge of label information. In short, 
we find that larger operations and early adopters were significantly less likely to use 32 oz/acre. 
Conversely, these same types of farmers were more likely to use the standard rate of 0.75 lb/acre. These 
findings reinforce some previous research that points to greater information acquisition in new 
technologies by early adopters and larger farms (see, e.g., Feder and Slade, 1984; Diederen et al., 2003). 
 In the third and final stage of our analysis, we look further into the issue of whether there were 
real benefits to using products that are more concentrated if one were planning to apply glyphosate at 
higher rates. To do so, we identify a subset of farmers that we term “rationally attentive.” These are 
producers who early in the sample applied new, more concentrated glyphosate products at the 
recommended standard rate of 0.75 lb/acre. By applying more concentrated products at the standard 
application rate, these individuals not only demonstrated an awareness of the changes, but also a 
willingness to learn the new rate and apply that knowledge in the field. We then estimate the 
relationship between application rates and concentration levels for this subgroup during the 2003-
2011 period. We find that even “rationally attentive” individuals use more concentrated products at 
higher rates. Thus, part of the positive concentration effect appears to be the result of deliberate 
behavior. For example, there may be cost savings from using more concentrated products at higher 
rates. However, we also find that the impact of glyphosate concentration on application rates is 
significantly smaller for rationally attentive farmers compared to the rest of the population, which is 
consistent with the presence of mechanisms such as label confusion and habit. Using the model 
estimates for the rationally attentive individuals, we simulate a counterfactual scenario in which all 
individuals are held to be rationally attentive. The simulation predicts that label confusion and/or 
habit increased farmers’ glyphosate expenditures (revenues for glyphosate sellers) by (at least) $59 
million per year, the vast majority of which went to Monsanto. 
 The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. First, we provide further details on the history of 
glyphosate, market trends following the expiration of Monsanto’s patent, and information concerning 
glyphosate formulations as well as application rates and their relationship to concentration rates. Next 
we present the basic econometric framework, followed by a description of the data and initial 
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regression results. We then investigate the factors associated with using 32 oz/acre and 0.75 lb/acre. 
We follow this with the development of a strategy for decomposing the concentration effect. We then 
report results for rationally attentive and all other individuals, followed by a counterfactual simulation 
of glyphosate use and revenues. Finally, we provide concluding comments.  
 
2. Glyphosate 
Glyphosate was introduced commercially in 1974 by Monsanto Co. as Roundup®. It is a powerful, 
broad-spectrum herbicide with favorable environmental properties (e.g., low toxicity).1 As such, it 
quickly gained commercial success among agricultural producers, but its use was limited by its non-
selective properties (i.e., glyphosate was also toxic to crops). Growers primarily used it prior to planting 
or in circumstances where crop exposure could be avoided (Duke and Powles, 2008). These limitations 
were lifted with the adoption of genetically engineered glyphosate tolerant (GT) crops, first introduced 
in 1996. Farmers could now apply glyphosate on fields with GT varieties after the crop had emerged 
(i.e., post-emergence) without causing crop injury. The incentives for farmers to adopt GT varieties 
were compelling (Ciliberto, Moschini, and Perry 2017). Before the advent of GT crops, a typical 
producer had to use multiple herbicides, each able to treat a small range of weeds, at different stages 
of the planting process, and often had to supplement those herbicides with mechanical cultivation. By 
contrast, the GT crop production system was simple and effective: a grower could plant the crop and 
then rely exclusively on post-emergence applications of a single herbicide (glyphosate). 2  Rapid 
diffusion of GT crop varieties resulted in a massive expansion of glyphosate use, turning it into the 
most widely used herbicide in the world. In the United States, where the adoption of GT crops 
currently exceeds 90% of acres in corn, soybeans, and cotton, total agricultural glyphosate use 
exceeded 284 million pounds in 2014, a more than twenty-fold increase from 1992 (USGS, 2017). 
Glyphosate use in corn and soybeans alone accounted for about 73% of total US glyphosate use.  
In 2000, Monsanto’s patent on glyphosate expired, and in the years that followed significant 
changes took place (Table 1). The number of companies producing glyphosate expanded from one to 
                                                 
1 Widely held beliefs about glyphosate’s safety, however, have recently been questioned (Grimwood, 
2017; Waldman et al., 2017). 
 
2 Because mechanical cultivation was less needed with a GT system, adoption of conservation tillage 
and no-tillage production systems also increased significantly as a result of GT variety adoption 
(Perry, Moschini, and Hennessy, 2016a). 
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30 while the number of products rose from six to more than 70. The number of concentrations rose 
from four to a maximum of nine in 2007 before settling at six in 2011. Monsanto’s hold on the industry 
declined considerably as well, as evidenced by the fact that the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
of market concentration declined from 1.00 in 1999 to a low of 0.197 in 2010. The increased 
competition, in turn, led to a significant decline in glyphosate prices, from $12.42/lb in 2000 to 
$4.74/lb in 2011. At the same time, the amount of glyphosate applied per acre increased by over 30%. 
 
--Table 1-- 
 
2.1 Products and Formulations 
A glyphosate product formulation has three components: the amount of parent acid (i.e., glyphosate), 
salt, and proprietary components. A typical product label lists the amount of active ingredient (ai) in 
lb/gal, the type of salt, and the amount of acid equivalent (ae) (also in lb/gal). The ai/gal differs from 
the ae/gal because the former includes the salt. The most important component is the ae 
concentration. Two glyphosate products with different ai concentrations but the same ae 
concentration will perform essentially the same. Differences in the salt and proprietary components—
inert ingredients like surfactants and defoamers—do not seem to generate significant differences in 
effectiveness (Mueller et al., 2006; Mahoney, Shropshire, and Sikkema, 2014).3  
Prior to the year 2000 there was essentially one glyphosate formulation: Monsanto’s Roundup 
Ultra®, which contained 3 lb ae/gal of glyphosate. Upon expiration of its patent, Monsanto 
introduced Roundup UltraMax®, a new glyphosate formulation with 3.7 lb ae/gal. In subsequent 
years, Monsanto and their competitors introduced several other formulations. Ultimately, six different 
concentration levels emerged on the market: 3 lb ae/gal, 3.7 lb ae/gal, 4 lb ae/gal, 4.17 lb ae/gal, 4.5 
lb ae/gal, and 5 lb ae/gal (henceforth, when we write “lb/gal”, we are referring to ae and not ai).  
 
2.2 Application Rates 
The glyphosate application rate is defined as the amount (pounds) of glyphosate ae applied per treated 
acre. The product label for each of the different commercial formulations contains instructions for 
the recommended application rate. The recommended rate may vary depending on the crop, time of 
                                                 
3 Nonetheless, firms rely on proprietary components as a product differentiation strategy in their 
marketing efforts. 
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application, weed type, and weed height. For example, the recommended rate for the treatment of 
taller weeds may be greater than the recommended rate for comparatively smaller weeds.4 The general 
standard recommended field rate—the rate recommended for most situations—has historically been 
0.75 lb/acre. Because different products may contain different ae concentrations, a farmer needs to 
appropriately adjust the product-specific rate—the rate in fl oz/acre—needed to achieve a particular field 
rate. The product-specific rate required to achieve the standard field rate of 0.75 lb/acre is given by  
 
 128(oz/gal)lb/acre)
concentration(lb/gal)
0.75( ,x  
 
where x  is the application rate expressed in fl oz/acre. For example, the product rate for the classic 
3 lb/gal formulation is 32 fl oz/acre, and the product rate for a 4 lb/gal formulation is 24 fl oz/acre. 
Table 2 provides the product rate needed to achieve the standard rate of 0.75 lb/acre and the 1.5 dose 
rate of 1.13 lb/acre for each of six popular formulations. Note that these numbers reflect what is 
written on the label and are thus not always an exact conversion to 0.75 lb/acre. Some of the more 
concentrated products actually recommend rates that imply a slightly higher rate than 0.75 lb/acre – 
e.g., the recommended rate on 4.5 lb/gal formulations is 22 oz/gal, which implies an acre-rate of 
about 0.77 lb/acre.  
 
--Table 2-- 
 
2.3 Different Application Rates with Different Concentrations 
Without further information, it might be expected that glyphosate application rates would not differ 
significantly across concentration levels: farmers should adjust their application rates in accordance 
with label recommendations. However, various patterns in the data suggest that such adjustments 
were often not made.5 One indication is the overall trend in application rates. As the market became 
increasingly saturated with higher concentration products, application rates rose significantly. Between 
                                                 
4 See Table A1 in the Appendix for the recommended label rates of different popular products on 
the basis of weed height.  
 
5 The tables and figures presented in this section are based on farm-level survey data from GfK 
Kynetec. Further details about these data are provided in the Results section. 
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1998 and 2011, the mean application rate rose from 0.73 lb/acre to 0.89 lb/acre, a 22% increase 
(Figure 1). During the same time, the quantity share for products with 3 lb/gal fell from 99% to about 
26%. 
 
--Figure 1-- 
 
More detailed evidence on the drivers of these trends is provided in Table 3, which presents 
mean application rates and mean prices for the three most commonly purchased concentrations from 
1998 to 2011. Three stylized facts emerge from these numbers. First, more concentrated products 
were applied at significantly higher rates and this difference was fairly stable over time. Second, and 
relatedly, the prices of the different formulations cannot explain these differences. In other words, for 
most of the sample, more concentrated products were priced higher per unit acid equivalent. Finally, 
there is also a general upward trend in application rates for all concentrations over time. This is in part 
likely due to falling prices, but there is a particularly sharp rise in the final two periods, which may in 
part be explained by rising crop output prices, which raise the marginal value of yield-enhancing inputs 
(such as herbicides), and/or the gradual onset of glyphosate weed resistance. The latter refers to weed 
species that have evolved tolerance to glyphosate, an issue which has become increasingly problematic 
in recent years (Perry et al., 2016b). Producers have responded by supplementing glyphosate with 
other herbicides, or in some cases by increasing the glyphosate application rate. 
 
--Table 3— 
 
2.3 Historical Inertia: 32 Fluid Ounces 
A particularly revealing piece of evidence is the distribution of application rates across different 
concentrations. Figure 2 contains histograms of application rates for six of the most popular 
commercial glyphosate products in our sample. The red line marks the standard application rate – 
which ranges from 20 to 32 oz/acre - for each product. As expected, there is significant clustering at 
the standard rate for all products. However, what it is more remarkable is the clustering that occurs at 
the green line, which marks the rate of 32 fl oz/acre, the historical product rate for a standard 
application of 3 lb/gal products. This clustering occurs for all products in Figure 2, and we found it 
to occur also for virtually every product not shown here. The clustering is also fairly stable over time. 
In the Appendix, we present additional histograms for each concentration level over time (Figure A1). 
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For some concentrations, the frequency of 32 ounce applications actually increases over time, and in 
some cases there is evidence of farmers possibly misapplying products at rates other than 32 ounces. 
For example, a substantial fraction (~20%) of farmers applied Touchdown HiTech (5 lb/gal) at 24 
oz/acre, which is the standard rate for Touchdown Total (4.17 lb/gal). 
 
--Figure 2-- 
 
What exactly the clustering at 32 fl oz/acre indicates is an open question. At the very least, it 
indicates that a heuristic or habitual component was present. With the exception of 4.5 lb/gal 
formulations, the rate of 32 fl oz/acre has no obvious rationale other than that it is what farmers had 
always used. For all concentrations besides 3 and 4.5 lb/gal products, the annual weed rate tables for 
different products never explicitly suggest 32 ounces (see Table 2 and Table A1). Whether pure error 
was involved is hard to establish. Another thing to note is that the clustering occurred early in the 
2000s, well before glyphosate resistance was an issue, and before glyphosate prices had drastically 
fallen. Consider, for example, that the share of applications that exceeded 0.8 lb/acre was 0.14 in 1998, 
0.12 in 1999, 0.13 in 2000, and then increased to 0.21 in 2001 and 2002 upon the widespread adoption 
of Roundup UltraMax® (3.7 lb/gal). This happened concurrently with a slight increase in mean prices 
from 2000 to 2001. Overall, these facts are difficult to reconcile with a full-information, rational model 
of behavior. Nonetheless, there may be other factors that contributed to the trends in, and clustering 
of, application rates. In particular, more systematic control is desirable for factors such as unobserved 
farmer heterogeneity, prices, and weed pressure.  
 
3. Empirical Methods 
We now examine more systematically whether changes in the concentration level of glyphosate 
products led to changes in usage behavior. We do so by first estimating how the application rate varies 
in response to the concentration level, while controlling for prices, individual heterogeneity, generic 
product dummies, the timing of application, the crop, and time effects.  
The unit of observation is an application of a specific glyphosate product to a particular field. 
A field is defined as a unique combination of the seed planted, the tillage system used, and the 
sequence of herbicide products used. It is also possible for a field to receive more than one glyphosate 
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application.6 Denote an application by i , a farmer by f , and a year by t . We estimate regressions of 
the following form:  
(1) ( )ift ift ift t f ifty g z x           
where ifty  is the glyphosate application rate (lb ae/acre), iftz  is the concentration level of the 
glyphosate product used in application i  (lb ae/gal), and iftx  is a vector of controls which include: 
the price of glyphosate ($/lb), dummy variables for whether or not the product is generic, the type of 
crop, and whether glyphosate is applied pre-emergence (before the crop sprouts). The “generic” 
dummy controls for the possibility that farmers perceive generic products as less effective and 
therefore compensate by increasing application rates. Although peer-reviewed studies find no 
significant differences in efficacy between generic and non-generic products (Hartzler, Pringnitz, and 
Resfell, 2002; Mahoney, Shropshire, and Sikkema, 2014), anecdotal evidence via web-based forums 
suggests that some farmers are wary of generic products, particularly those not produced in the United 
States.7 As noted, previous work has shown that some individuals are willing to purchase non-generic 
medications at a price premium, despite having the same ingredients. Lastly, the pre-emergence 
dummy controls for the fact that post-emergence applications are typically more re-active and thus 
weed height may tend to be higher, resulting in higher application rates.  
 The main component of interest is the function of the concentration level, ( )iftg z . We 
consider two different specifications of this function. First, we postulate a linear relationship between 
the concentration level and the application rate, that is ( )ift iftg z z . This specification implies that  
concentration levels do not impact the application rate if   is not statistically different from zero. 
Alternatively, we estimate the dummy-variable specification ( ) ,ift j ijjg z D  where
 3.7, 4, 4.17, 4.5, 5j  indexes the concentration level of the glyphosate product and ijD  is a 
dummy variable equal to one if a product with concentration j  was applied on plot i  (zero otherwise). 
In this case, the concentration level is simply a concentration-specific intercept shifter (relative to the 
                                                 
6 For example, if a field receives an application of glyphosate once before the crop emerges and once 
after the crop emerges, this would constitute two observations. 
 
7 For further details on these web-based forums, see Agricultural Web Forums in the Appendix. 
11 
 
base concentration level of 3 lb ae/gal). As such, it is more flexible when compared to the linear 
specification. Because we set the 3 lb/gal concentration as the reference formulation, higher 
concentration levels impact application rates if we obtain statistically significant estimates for the 
respective j  coefficients.  
 The model also includes time and farmer fixed effects ( t  and f , respectively). Time effects 
control for unobserved, commonly shared shocks that influence the application rate. Two examples 
include crop output prices and glyphosate weed resistance. Both potentially increase the application 
rate and, because they increased later in the sample, are positively correlated with applied 
concentration levels. Farmer fixed effects control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the 
farm level. For instance, they control for the possibility that growers who apply glyphosate at higher 
field rates prefer to use more concentrated products, perhaps to better manage higher application 
costs.  
 The impact of concentration levels on the application rate is identified by variation within 
farmers’ application rates across different products. It is important to be clear about what we are not 
identifying. We cannot explicitly control for unobserved factors that are individual or field specific 
and that vary over time. Moreover, it may be the case that when producers plan to spray at higher 
rates, they deliberately use more concentrated products. Why might this be? One possible reason is 
that, by entailing smaller volumes (ceteris paribus), more concentrated products may have lower 
storage and/or transportation costs. Alternatively, farmers may simply prefer to adjust their rates 
through discrete product changes (holding the product rate fixed) rather than through product rate 
adjustments for a given product. For example, a farmer wanting to use the product rate they have 
become accustomed to (e.g., 32 oz/acre), but also increase rates, could jump from a 3 lb/gal product 
to 4.5 lb/gal product.  
These possibilities have at least two implications for our analytical framework. First, if there 
are indeed unobserved factors correlated with both the chosen concentration level and the dosing 
level, then the estimated concentration coefficients may be biased. Second, even supposing that the 
estimated concentration coefficients are unbiased, their interpretation is complicated by the possible 
existence of complementarities (e.g., cost savings) from using more concentrated products at higher 
rates. In such a case, the estimated coefficients on the concentration variable(s) will potentially reflect 
both cost savings and farmers not using label information. Some of these issues are addressed through 
robustness checks in the Appendix. In any event, in the first stage of our initial analysis, our main goal 
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is to establish whether the observed correlations between concentration and dosing rates can be 
explained by prices, the type of products, or the other controllable factors. Next, in the second stage 
of our analysis, we avoid some of these issues by focusing on the factors associated with the dosing 
choices of 32 oz/acre and 0.75 lb/acre. Finally, in the third stage of our analysis, the regression model 
of equation (1) is extended to look further into whether the estimated effect on the concentration 
variables represent deliberate choices or whether some farmers did not make use of label information.   
 
4. Results 
The baseline econometric analysis relies on a large sample of farm-level data on applications of 
glyphosate in U.S. corn and soybean production over the period 1998-2011. The commercial name of 
the dataset is AgroTrak®, which was constructed by GfK Kynetec, a unit of a major market research 
firm.8 Each year GfK conducts computer-assisted telephone interviews of farmers throughout the 
United States. The sampling procedure is designed to be representative at the crop reporting district 
(CRD) level, a multi-county sub-state region identified by the National Agricultural Statistics Service 
(NASS) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Farmers are surveyed in detail about the 
pesticide products they used: which ones, how much, when they were applied, on what crops, and the 
prices paid. Further details about the dataset are provided in the Appendix (see Data Description and 
Tables A2-A5). 
While producers report all of the pesticides they used, here we only employ observations in 
which glyphosate was used. This results in 191,789 observations across an annual average of 5,228 
farmers. We further trim this dataset in two ways. First, a small share of glyphosate products are pre-
mixes (products that contain glyphosate and at least one other herbicide mixed together). Because our 
focus is on glyphosate as a standalone product, we drop these observations, reducing the dataset to 
185,377 observations. We also drop products with concentration levels that were seldom observed 
(595 observations).9 Overall, our final dataset consists of 184,782 observations across 31,417 distinct 
farmers across 284 CRDs. Importantly, for many individuals we observe multiple periods, which 
allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity through farmer-specific fixed effects. This feature 
                                                 
8 The GfK AgroTrak data have also been used, among others, in Thelin and Stone (2013), Mitchell 
(2014), Perry, Moschini, and Hennessy (2016a) and Perry et al. (2016b).  
 
9 We also run our analysis having included infrequently purchased concentrations and the results are 
unaffected.  
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is also necessary for the second stage of our empirical analysis, where we compare usage rates over 
time between subsets of individuals.  
Table 4 provides summary statistics for the model variables. The mean and median application 
rates were 0.82 and 0.75, respectively. The latter is consistent with 0.75 lb/acre as the standard rate. 
The mean concentration level was 3.58 lb/gal, with a maximum of 5 lb/gal. The dummy variables for 
each of the different concentrations inform on the frequency with which they were used. The top 
concentrations were 3 lb/gal at 54% of applications, 4.5 lb/gal at 26%, and 3.7 lb/gal at 10%. For the 
remaining variables, the mean price, which is deflated by the USDA crop sector index for prices paid 
by farmers, was $12.61/lb, 41% of applications were on corn, 27% were pre-emergence, 47% were 
on no-till fields, and 42% of products were generic (i.e., non-Monsanto products).10  
 
--Table 4-- 
 
Table 5 contains results for the two main regression specifications. Overall, the parameters are 
tightly estimated and the signs for the non-concentration variables are broadly consistent with 
expectations. The price coefficient is negative and highly significant. Its magnitude implies that a real 
$10 decrease in the price of glyphosate increases the application rate by 0.034 lbs/acre, or just a bit 
under 5% of the standard rate. From 1998 to 2011, the mean real price of glyphosate fell by about 
$24/lb, implying that prices accounted for about 0.08 lb/acre of the increase in application rates. 
Applications on corn show slightly lower glyphosate use than on soybeans. This can possibly be 
explained by the fact that early canopy closure in corn helps weed control. Pre-emergence application 
rates were lower than post-emergence application rates, confirming that, on average, weed pressure 
tends to be more problematic at the post-emergence stage. Finally, and having controlled for price 
differentials, generic products were applied at statistically significantly higher rates when compared to 
non-generics (i.e., Monsanto products). Although the difference is small in magnitude, it suggests that 
some farmers are either unaware of existing studies on the efficacy of generic versus non-generic 
products, or do not believe the results of such studies. This finding complements some previous work 
that has shown consumers to purchase non-generic medications at a significant price premium 
(Handel and Schwartzstein, 2018). 
                                                 
10 We also estimated all specifications with nominal prices and CPI-deflated prices. In both cases, the 
results are largely unchanged.  
14 
 
--Table 5 -- 
 
The concentration coefficients are statistically significant and large in magnitude. The linear 
specification implies that a 1 lb/gal increase in the concentration level increased the application rate 
by over 0.14 lb/acre, or about 19% of the standard rate of 0.75 lb/acre. The dummy variable 
specification produces coefficient effects that are nearly the same as those implied by the linear 
specification. For example, the coefficient for dummy variable 4D  implies that, relative to the  
baseline 3 lb/gal formulation, adding 1 lb/gal of glyphosate increases the average application rate by 
0.145 lb/acre, while the coefficient for the dummy variable 5D  implies that adding 2 lb/gal of 
glyphosate increases the average application rate by 0.276 lb/acre. Overall, these magnitudes explain 
a significant share of the overall increase in application rates over time.  
 Multiple robustness checks were conducted to ascertain the sensitivity of the baseline 
regression results. These robustness checks consist of the following: adding different sets of fixed 
effects, removing potentially endogenous controls, estimating separate models for generic and non-
generic products, and removing outliers. Overall, the estimation results from these alternative 
specifications demonstrate the same patterns as those presented in Table 5. For further details and 
description, see Robustness Checks in the Appendix, as well as Tables A6 and A7. 
 
4.1 Factors Associated with the “Usual” 32 Ounce rate and the Standard 0.75 lb/acre rate 
As noted, one limitation of the baseline regression approach is that we cannot control for 
unobservable factors that are individual and time specific. However, even if farmers deliberately use 
more concentrated products when applying glyphosate at higher rates, the previously demonstrated 
clustering at 32 ounces indicates that farmers likely use a “rule of thumb” in choosing their rates. The 
characteristics that are correlated with these choices are therefore of interest in their own right. 
Unfortunately, our dataset limits the set of characteristics we can investigate: we do not directly 
observe variables of possible interest such as farm size, education, or age.  But we do observe how 
many acres a farmer planted to each crop, the county where a farmer is located, whether a farmer was 
an early adopter of a new glyphosate product, and the length (in years) of experience a farmer had 
with a particular concentration. In this section, we estimate linear probability models that relate each 
of these characteristics to two types of application rate choices with more concentrated products: (i) 
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the pre-patent-expiration product-specific rate of 32 oz/acre and (ii) the standard field rate of 0.75 
lb/acre. 
 Previous research has generally found that factors such as larger farm size, education, and 
experience are associated with early adoption of new technologies and information acquisition (see, 
e.g., Feder and Slade, 1984; Diederen et al., 2003). These findings suggest that certain types of farmers 
will be more likely to choose the historical usual rate of 32 oz/acre. Specifically, if we view the choice 
of 32 oz/acre with more concentrated products as the habitual choice, then existing research suggests 
that larger operations, early adopters of new products, and more experienced users will be less likely 
to choose this rate. Conversely, choosing an application rate of 0.75 lb/acre with more concentrated 
products requires greater acquisition of information, which suggests that larger operations, early 
adopters, and experienced users will be more likely to use 0.75 lb/acre.   
 
--Table 6-- 
 
 Table 6 contains summary statistics for several characteristics of interest. The first five rows 
illustrate the distribution of observations pertaining to each product concentration by acres planted.  
The remaining rows contain average corn and soybean yields, as measured by NASS county average 
data, as well as the frequency of use in the central corn belt (CCB) by product concentration.11 Two 
patterns are apparent in Table 6. First, larger operations are more likely to use more concentrated 
products. For example, 17 percent of 3 lb/gal product users planted less than 100 acres versus 13 
percent of 4.5 lb/gal product users. Conversely, relatively more users of 4.17 and 4.5 lb/gal products 
were larger operations. Second, regions with higher yield per acre tend to use more concentrated 
products. The exception to these regularities is for 5 lb/gal products, which seem to be an outlier 
among the more concentrated products. This concentration level was introduced later in the sample 
and was used by very few farmers. Additional details and statistics on the factors associated with 
chosen concentration levels are provided in the Appendix (see Table A8). 
 To estimate the linear probability models, the distribution by farm size presented in Table 6 is 
converted into indicator variables that take a value equal to one whenever a farmer planted within the 
given acre range. For example, the indicator variable (<100) takes a value of one if a farmer planted 
                                                 
11 The CCB includes IA, IL, IN, and the southern agricultural CRDs in MN and WI. 
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less than 100 acres in soybeans (or corn). The two types of application rate variables are created as 
follows. First, we create an indicator variable equal to one for each observation in which the 
application rate was 32 fluid ounces per acre, or what may be thought of as the pre-patent-expiration 
“usual” rate. For these observations, we restrict the analysis to 3.7, 4, 4.17, and 5 lb/gal products. We 
(conservatively) omit 4.5 lb/gal products because 32 ounces is the suggested rate for the 1.5x dose for 
this product, and thus a reasonable focal point adjustment for farmers who sought a more potent 
dose. We create a second indicator variable that takes the value of one whenever the standard 
application rate of 0.75 lb/acre is used. In this case, the analysis is restricted to all concentrations 
exceeding 3 lb/gal. Summary statistics and additional description for each of these dummy variables 
is provided in the Appendix (see Summary Statistics for 32 oz/acre and 0.75 lb/acre Application Choices and 
Tables A9 and A10). About 30% of applications were 32 oz/acre and about 30% were also 0.75 
lb/acre.  
 Because the panel is not balanced, in order to estimate models with an early adoption variable, 
the analysis was restricted to subsamples of farmers from specific years.12 We estimate models for two 
such subsamples. In one case we look at surveyed farmers from 2001, with early adopters being coded 
as those who used Roundup UltraMax (3.7 lb/gal). In a second case, we estimate a model using the 
2003 subsample of farmers, with early adopters being coded as those who used Roundup 
WeatherMAX (4.5 lb/gal).13 Table 7 reports results for these regressions. The first three columns 
contain results for the 32 oz/acre rate regressions and the last three columns report results for the 
standard 0.75 lb/acre regressions. Overall, a strong pattern emerges: larger operations are significantly 
less likely to use the usual 32 oz. rate. For example, a farmer that planted more than 1,000 acres in 
corn or soybeans was anywhere from just under 14 percent to over 15 percent less likely than a farmer 
with less than 100 acres to use the 32 oz. rate. Columns 2 and 3 indicate that early adopters were also 
significantly less likely to apply glyphosate at 32 oz/acre. Early adopters from 2001 were over 5% less 
likely to use the usual rate (compared to their 2001 cohort), and 2003 early adopters were nearly 11% 
less likely to use the usual rate (compared to their 2003 cohort). There is also limited evidence of 
experience reducing the likelihood of the 32 oz. rate: the experience coefficient is negative and 
                                                 
12 The main issue is that many individuals were not surveyed in the years that a new product was 
released. 
 
13 We considered other products as well, but for these other products the number of early adopters 
was very small. 
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significant in the first column but insignificant in the second and third columns. Farmers in the CCB 
were also less likely to use a 32 oz. rate in two of three specifications. 
 
--Table 7-- 
 
 The estimation results for the “standard” rate dummy variable models (columns 4-6) mirror 
the “usual” rate results of columns 1-3: larger operations and early adopters are significantly more likely 
to use the standard rate. In two cases, experience with a product increases the likelihood of using the 
standard rate. CCB farmers are not significantly different from non-CCB farmers.  
 Overall, these results suggest that using a “rule of thumb” is significantly more likely among 
small farms and late adopters, whereas using the standard rate, which requires the acquisition and 
implementation of label information (either acquired from the label itself or from someone familiar 
with the label), is significantly more likely among large operations and early adopters.  
 
4.2 Was Rational Behavior or Label Confusion Behind the Concentration Effect? 
An important question remains: why do U.S. corn and soybean farmers apply more concentrated 
products at significantly higher rates? More specifically, is the positive association between 
concentration and the application rate the result of error and/or label confusion, or rather the result 
of farmers deliberately choosing to use more concentrated products at higher rates (e.g., for cost 
reduction reasons)? The evidence so far suggests that both mechanisms may play a role. The fact that 
32 oz/acre appears so often in the data, and the fact that application rates increased substantially well 
before significant price declines, and before the emergence of glyphosate weed resistance, suggests 
that behavioral and/or inattentive elements played a role. A behavioral element is also indirectly 
implicated by the results from the analysis of factors related to what type of rate is chosen (the “usual” 
rate or the “standard” rate). On the other hand, the positive correlation between planted acres and 
concentration levels leaves open the possibility of cost savings. To answer this question satisfactorily 
would require more information about farmers’ knowledge of each product, as well as further details 
about their decision processes concerning both why they chose a particular concentration and why 
they chose a particular rate. We can nonetheless use the panel aspect of the data to gain insights into 
this issue. Specifically, we conduct an exercise that uncovers differences in usage tendencies between 
a population of farmers that are likely informed about proper rates and a population of farmers that 
likely includes some individuals that are uninformed or inattentive. The exercise is as follows.  
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 First, we identify a subset of farmers we term “rationally attentive.” These are farmers who, 
early on, applied new glyphosate products at the (recommended) standard rate. Specifically, we identify 
the subset of farmers that applied Roundup UltraMax®, which contains 3.7 lb/gal of glyphosate, at 
the standard acre rate of 0.75 lb/acre in the years 2000-2002. We then compare the behavior of this 
subset of farmers to all other farmers during the period 2003-2011.14 In particular, we estimate the 
dummy variable version of equation (1) for each sub-group during the 2003-2011 interval and compare 
the coefficient estimates.15 In total, we observe 9,119 applications across 909 rationally attentive 
individuals, and 132,065 applications across 22,004 other individuals.  
We select farmers that used Roundup UltraMax® at the standard rate for two reasons. First, 
a standard dose for Roundup UltraMax® is 26 fl oz/acre. Because this dose rarely occurred with 3 
lb/gal products, there is little possibility that a farmer’s choice of this rate was the result of a mistake 
or habit. By choosing this application rate an individual clearly demonstrates knowledge of the 
appropriate rate and a willingness to adjust their behavior. The second reason is more practical – 
Roundup UltraMax® is the first major product with a different concentration rate. Thus, by using it 
as an identifier for rationally attentive behavior, we still have nine years left in our sample to compare 
the behavior of rationally attentive individuals with the rest of the population.16  
In estimating separate regressions for each population, we aim to learn two things. First, if the 
concentration coefficients for rationally attentive farmers are still positive and significant then this 
would suggest that there are genuine reasons (cost reduction, perhaps) for using more concentrated 
products at higher rates.17 Second, if label confusion existed for some farmers, then we would expect 
the estimated concentration coefficients for rationally attentive farmers to be smaller than the same 
                                                 
14 We use the 2003-2011 sub-period because if we used the entire period then the coefficients for the 
rationally attentive individuals would have downward bias by construction. Put differently, rationally 
attentive individuals are precisely those individuals for whom we do not observe a concentration 
effect in the 2000-2002 interval.  
 
15 In practice, we estimate a pooled regression but allow for the variable coefficients to differ by sub-
group. 
 
16 As an alternative, we use Roundup WeatherMAX® in 2003 and 2004 for identifying rationally 
attentive behavior. Results for this procedure are provided in Table A11 of the Appendix. In short, 
we find similar results.  
 
17 The caveat to this is that rationally attentive farmers may still err later in the sample with other 
products. Our underlying assumption is that this is going to be a relatively rare occurrence. 
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coefficients for the general population. The basic idea is that the general population will consist partly 
of rationally attentive farmers and partly of non-rationally-attentive farmers, by which we mean those 
farmers that are other than rationally attentive, i.e., everyone else. The regression estimates will 
therefore consist of a mixture of the concentration effects for these two subgroups and thus exceed 
the estimates for rationally attentive farmers if there is label confusion among non-rationally attentive 
farmers.  
Table 8 presents summary statistics for each of the two groups (see Figure A2 for the 
geographical distribution of rationally attentive farmers). Overall, the means are similar in magnitude 
but differ statistically in most cases. Rationally attentive individuals purchase fewer products with 3 
lb/gal, instead opting more frequently for 4.5 lb/gal products. They are also less likely to purchase 
generics and they tend to purchase products with slightly higher prices. Rationally attentive farmers 
also tend to have larger operations: only 9.6% of operations are less than 100 acres, compared to 15% 
for everyone else. Conversely, more than 46% of their operations were greater than 500 acres, 
compared to just under 40% for everyone else.  
 
--Table 8-- 
 
Table 9 reports the coefficients (and standard errors) for each of the two sub-groups, as well 
as their differences, estimated with a pooled regression model. Overall, the coefficients are tightly 
estimated. For variables other than concentration levels, the coefficients are similar (the difference 
between the two groups is not statistically significant). 
 
--Table 9-- 
 
For the concentration parameters, two findings emerge. First, even rationally attentive 
individuals apply glyphosate at higher rates with more concentrated products. The effect is relatively 
stable across products, with the exception of 4.5 lb/gal products, for which the concentration effect 
is 0.17 lb/acre. One potential explanation for this is that the 1.5x standard dose for 4.5 lb/gal is 32 fl 
oz/acre, the historical “usual” rate for 3 lb/gal products. Thus, farmers wanting to use a higher rate, 
but still use 32 fluid oz/acre, may have jumped to a 4.5 lb/gal product.  
The second finding is that the concentration effect for rationally attentive individuals is 
considerably lower than the effect for all other individuals, and these differences are statistically 
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significant.18 In most cases the coefficient is about 30% lower. For 5 lb/gal products, the effect is 
nearly 66% lower. Overall, we interpret these differences as evidence that part of the concentration 
effect was due to label confusion, error, habit, or some combination of these mechanisms. A possible 
alternative explanation is that these differences are due to differences in the structure of cost savings 
between the two populations. One possibility we considered is that the same pattern would emerge if 
we estimated the concentration models separately for each acres planted range, the idea being that 
cost savings would differ by the size of operation. We found, however, that concentration coefficients, 
while slightly different, did not differ significantly by size of operation, and are nowhere near the 
extent of the differences presented in Table 9. Overall, this suggests that the differences are likely due 
to a greater frequency of label confusion, error, or habit in the general population.  
 
5. Some Implications 
Using our estimates from Table 9, we simulate two counterfactual scenarios: one in which all growers 
behave as “rationally attentive” individuals, and one in which the concentration level does not impact 
the application rate. The latter scenario is simulated to give an upper bound on the concentration 
effect. As previously discussed, part of the concentration effect may be due to a complementarity 
effect: using more concentrated products at higher rates may offer costs savings. Thus, the “No 
Concentration Effect” simulation may be viewed as informing on the scenario in which both 
behavioral and complementarity effects are absent.  
We simulate two variables of interest: total annual glyphosate use and total annual glyphosate 
expenditures by farmers. In running these simulations, we are implicitly assuming that agrochemical 
firms would not have adjusted their product lines or prices in a world where farmers’ glyphosate 
demand is adjusted as per the scenarios considered. The fact that the glyphosate market became largely 
competitive with the expiration of Monsanto’ patent suggests that this assumption of unchanged 
prices is plausible.  
 
5.1 Counterfactual Use and Costs 
For each observation, we compute predicted glyphosate use under three scenarios, denoted by 
1,2,3h  . Predicted glyphosate use for application i , by farmer f , in year t , and for scenario h , is 
                                                 
18 The F-statistic associated with the test that the concentration parameters for rationally attentive 
individuals are jointly zero is 12.65, which corresponds to a p-value<0.0001. 
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written as  
(2) ˆh hift ift iftq a y   
where  ˆ hifty  is the predicted application rate using the estimated parameters under scenario h  and ifta  
is the observed number of treated acres during application i .  Total annual glyphosate use is obtained 
by summing over applications and individuals: h ht iftf iQ q   . Predicted revenues are generated by 
multiplying predicted quantities by price and summing over applications and individuals:
h h
t ijt iftf iQ p q   , where iftp  is the actual price paid for glyphosate by farmer  f  ($/lb of ae). Table 
10 presents simulated glyphosate quantities and farmers’ expenditures. The predicted values for 
scenario 1h  , what we term the “Status Quo” scenario, contains the predicted annual values using 
the estimated parameters from Table 9. Specifically, for rationally attentive farmers, 1iftq  is generated 
using the estimated parameters from the “Rationally Attentive” column in Table 9, and for all other 
farmers 1iftq  is computing using the estimated parameters from the “Everyone Else” column. For 
scenario 2h  , termed the “All Rationally Attentive” scenario, we alter the predictions for non-
rationally attentive farmers by replacing their estimated concentration coefficients ( 3.7D  to 5D ) with 
the estimated concentration coefficients from the “Rationally Attentive” column in Table 9. Finally, 
scenario 3h  , or the “No Concentration Effect” scenario, predicts quantities and expenditures by 
setting the concentration parameters to zero (i.e., we set the coefficients on 3.7D  to 5D  in Table 9 to 
zero). Because we estimate the parameters during the 2003-2011 period, we restrict our predictions to 
this time frame. 
--Table 10-- 
 
Had all farmers behaved in the same way as rationally attentive individuals, the reduction in 
glyphosate use would have ranged from 3.5 million pounds (3.8%) in 2003 to a high of 10 million 
pounds (5.1%) in 2011. In the absence of any product concentration effect, the reduction would have 
ranged from approximately 11 million pounds (13.6%) to over 30 million pounds (17%).  
Perhaps the most interesting results are for total glyphosate expenditures. The average increase 
due to higher concentration products, based on the “All Rationally Attentive” scenario, was about $59 
22 
 
million per year (4.5%), with a high of $86.5 million (5%) in 2008 and 2009. In the “No Concentration 
Effect” scenario, the average increase was $191 million per year (14.6%), with a high of $280 million 
(15%) in 2009. From the perspective of the farmer, the average value of $59 million per year may be 
viewed as the cost of learning and adapting to the exact acre rate. Alternatively, the increase in farmers’ 
expenditures translates into additional revenues for glyphosate sellers. Hence, the effects we have 
uncovered constitute a sizeable transfer of rents from agricultural producers to agrochemical firms.  
Using product information, the surplus can be disaggregated by glyphosate firm. In particular, 
each predicted value for hiftq  corresponds to a particular product (e.g., Roundup UltraMax) and in turn 
a particular company (e.g., Monsanto). Thus, under each scenario we can obtain firm-specific 
predicted revenues by summing over hift iftp q  by company. Letting hdR  denote total revenue for 
company d  under scenario h , the fraction of surplus due to inattentive behavior for firm d  is given 
by:    1 2 1 2d dR R R R  , where hR  is total predicted revenue under scenario h . Of the total 
surplus, Monsanto received 89%, Syngenta 6%, and Dow AgroSciences 4%, with all remaining 
companies receiving less than 1%. Monsanto received such a large share because they sold, by far, the 
largest quantity of high concentration glyphosate products (see Table A12).19  Whether Monsanto’s 
leading market position in high concentration products was part of a pre-conceived strategy is difficult 
to ascertain. The fact that Monsanto introduced new types of products upon the expiration of their 
patent suggests a deliberate attempt to differentiate their products from generics. Because some of the 
modifications in these new products required patents or regulatory approval (Green and Beestman, 
2007), Monsanto was apparently able to dominate the higher concentration product market for several 
years. This type of strategy has been observed in other markets such as pharmaceuticals (Grabowski 
and Vernon, 1992). That farmers used newer, more concentrated products at higher rates, however, 
may have simply been a byproduct of Monsanto’s goal to further differentiate their products.  
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper explores the impact of changing glyphosate products’ concentration levels on U.S. farmers’ 
glyphosate usage behavior. We find that farmers apply more concentrated glyphosate products at 
                                                 
19 For context, during the period 2007-2011, Monsanto’s net income ranged from a low of $993 
million to a high of $2.2 billion (Source: Monsanto Archived Annual Reports). Given that corn and 
soybeans are not the only source of glyphosate revenues, an additional $59 million per year 
constituted a nontrivial addition to Monsanto’s bottom line.   
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significantly higher application rates, even after controlling for prices, unobserved heterogeneity, time 
effects, and several other controls. We further explore the behavioral sources of this effect, and 
attribute part of it to rational behavior and part of it to label confusion and/or habit.  
 In recent years, the preponderant view among economists about the ways that economic 
decisions are made has shifted from that of rational and consistent choice to a broader perspective 
where ostensibly non-rational and inconsistent choices can persist. These types of choices have been 
increasingly recognized as emanating from situations where information is incomplete, resources are 
limited, and complexity is high (Simon, 1955; Handel and Schwartzstein, 2018). As such, the best 
coping strategy – what may be viewed as individually rational under this broader viewpoint – may 
often involve heuristics that carry biases (Kahneman, 2003).  
Modern crop farming is a technologically intensive business where producers must manage 
production, storage, distribution, and marketing, while also dealing with finance, weather, pests, 
regulations, and other hazards. Successful farming in the face of such complexity leaves latitude for 
apparent inefficiencies in some activities. For example, it was recently observed that farmers likely do 
not take out subsidized insurance at levels that would both increase farm profit and provide greater 
financial protection (Du et al., 2017). Prior to 2000, the U.S. glyphosate market was simple both in 
form (essentially a monopoly) and in product formulation (just one concentration level). With 
emerging competition came alternative formulations, creating a more complex decision environment 
for farmers.  
Our work suggests that the choices of some individuals were driven by behavior that is 
heuristic in nature. This is important for several reasons. First, it implies an opportunity to reduce the 
use of glyphosate without losses in efficiency. In addition to increasing profitability, policy approaches 
to reduce input use will mitigate any adverse effects that the chemical has on ecological and human 
health. More generally our work points to the need to investigate possible behavioral effects for other 
household products, medications and inputs where negative externalities are a major concern (e.g., 
antibiotic use in animal agriculture or acetaminophen products). Among recent trends in the global 
agrichemical industry have been the growth of firms producing off-patent herbicides and insecticides, 
the quest for novel uses of these pesticides, and efforts to penetrate markets in low-income countries 
where farmers cannot afford branded and patented products (Weiss and Burger, 2017). All else equal, 
label rate complexity is likely to have greater impacts in lightly regulated countries, where farm 
operators have lower educational attainment, and where herbicide application is commonly done by 
hand.
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1. Glyphosate Product Concentration Shares and Mean Application Rate in U.S. Corn and 
Soybeans 
 
Note: The green, blue, purple, and red lines represent the quantity shares of the respective glyphosate 
concentrations (lb/gal). 
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Figure 2. Selected Top Commericial Glyphosate Product Histograms, 1998-2011 (y-axis: fraction of applications; x-axis: application rate 
(oz/acre)) 
 
Note: Product concentration level in parentheses.
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Table 1. Price, Use and Market Structure Trends in the U.S. Glyphosate Market 
 
Year Companies Products Concentrations Priceb lb/acrec HHId 
1998 1 6 4 15.86 0.90 1.00 
1999 1 8 4 12.76 0.93 1.00 
2000a 9 13 5 12.42 0.96 0.977 
2001 12 19 5 12.41 1.00 0.866 
2002 16 27 7 11.69 1.00 0.655 
2003 18 30 5 10.54 1.07 0.509 
2004 21 50 7 8.88 1.09 0.385 
2005 23 56 7 7.53 1.10 0.346 
2006 27 62 8 7.05 1.04 0.331 
2007 25 65 9 6.39 1.13 0.280 
2008 25 67 9 9.58 1.20 0.353 
2009 24 67 8 9.96 1.17 0.227 
2010 28 78 7 5.65 1.24 0.197 
2011 30 70 6 4.74 1.26 0.319 
aGlyphosate patent expired 
bU.S. average nominal prices ($/lb) 
cRatio of total glyphosate use to total corn and soybean acres with at least one glyphosate application   
dHerfindahl-Hirschman Index of market concentration 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Comparison of Recommended Application Rates for Common Glyphosate Formulations 
 
 
----Glyphosate Formulation---- 
0.75 lb ae/acre 
standard 1x dose 
1.13 lb ae/acre 
1.5x dose 
Salt lb ai/gal lb ae/gal -------fl oz/acre------- 
isopropylamine 4 3 32 48 
isopropylamine 5 3.7 26 39 
dimethylamine 5.07 4 24 36 
potassium 5 4.17 24 34 
potassium 5.5 4.5 22 32 
potassium 6 5 20 30 
 
Source: Armstrong and Lancaster (undated) 
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Table 3. Prices and Application Rates for Three Most Commonly Used Glyphosate Concentrations 
 
  Overall 
Rate 
lb ae/acre 
Rate (lb/acre) by Concentration Price ($/lb ae) by Concentration
Year 3 lb/gal 3.7 lb/gal 4.5 lb/gal 3 lb/gal. 3.7 lb/gal 4.5 lb/gal 
1998 0.73 0.75 15.88  
1999 0.72 0.73 12.79  
2000 0.72 0.73 0.73 12.44 13.99 
2001 0.73 0.71 0.77 12.95 11.84 
2002 0.73 0.70 0.79 0.95 11.67 11.72 9.48 
2003 0.76 0.73 0.81 0.85 9.14 11.75 11.55 
2004 0.78 0.73 0.81 0.90 7.16 11.00 10.44 
2005 0.79 0.73 0.80 0.90 6.59 9.19 8.53 
2006 0.80 0.74 0.81 0.91 6.09 9.28 8.02 
2007 0.81 0.74 0.79 0.92 5.66 8.67 7.28 
2008 0.83 0.76 0.81 0.91 9.32 10.89 10.28 
2009 0.83 0.76 0.83 0.92 8.85 10.43 11.90 
2010 0.86 0.80 0.96 4.58  7.19 
2011 0.89 0.82 0.97 4.35  5.10 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics for Model Variables 
 
Variable Mean S.D. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max 
Application Rate (lb/acre) 0.82 0.29 0.01 0.75 0.75 0.92 4.69 
Concentration (lb ae/gal) 3.58 0.66 3 3 3 4.5 5 
3D   0.54 0.5 0 0 1 1 1 
3.7D   0.1 0.3 0 0 0 0 1 
4D   0.06 0.24 0 0 0 0 1 
4.17D   0.03 0.18 0 0 0 0 1 
4.5D   0.26 0.44 0 0 0 1 1 
5D   0.01 0.07 0 0 0 0 1 
Pricea ($/lb ae) 12.61 7.47 2.2 6.57 10.64 18.03 50.96 
Corn 0.41 0.49 0 0 0 1 1 
Pre-Plant 0.27 0.44 0 0 0 1 1 
No-Till 0.47 0.5 0 0 0 1 1 
Generic 0.42 0.49 0 0 0 1 1 
 
aPrices are converted to 2011 $ by using the USDA crop sector index for prices paid. 
  
32 
 
Table 5. Product Concentration Effect on Glyphosate Use 
 Specification 
 Linear Dummy variable
Concentration 0.1431***  
 (0.0031)  
   
3.7D    0.1065
*** 
  (0.0056) 
   
4D    0.1450
*** 
  (0.0068) 
   
4.17D    0.1313
*** 
  (0.0085) 
   
4.5D    0.2253
*** 
  (0.0060) 
   
5D    0.2763
*** 
  (0.0198) 
   
Price -0.0035*** -0.0034*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
   
Corn -0.0089*** -0.0087*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0024) 
   
Pre-plant -0.0252*** -0.0252*** 
 (0.0043) (0.0043) 
   
Generic 0.0189*** 0.0293*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0052) 
   
No-till 0.0019 0.0018 
 (0.0023) (0.0023) 
N 184,782 184,782 
R2 0.488 0.489 
 
Dependent Variable: Application Rate (lb/acre/treatment). Standard errors, in parentheses, are 
clustered at the CRD level. All regressions include farmer-specific and time fixed effects. The 
coefficients are estimated using the Stata reghdfe package, based on the fixed effects estimator in 
Correia (2016). * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 6. Summary Statistics of Farmer Characteristics by Concentration Level 
 
 Glyphosate Concentration Level (lb/gal) 
 3 3.7 4 4.17 4.5 5 
Acres Grown Range       
    <100 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.13 
    100-249 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.26 
    250-499 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.22 0.22 
    500-999 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.24 
    >=1000 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.20 0.16 
Corn Yielda 136.82 138.18 148.21 149.22 145.61 135.77 
Soybean Yielda 40.25 40.54 44.04 44.00 42.65 40.40 
Central Corn Beltb 0.33 0.34 0.46 0.52 0.45 0.29 
Observations 99,053 18,468 11,198 6,231 48,882 950 
 
aCounty-level yield, bu/acre (source: USDA-NASS). 
bThe central corn belt (CCB) includes IL, IN, IA, and the southern CRDs in WI and MN. 
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Table 7. Linear Probability Model Results for 32 oz/acre and 0.75 lb/acre Choices 
 Applied Product at 32 oz/acre† Applied Product at 0.75 lb/acre§ 
 (1) (2)d (3)e (4) (5)d (6)e 
Acres Growna       
    100-249 -0.0387*** -0.0566** -0.0538** 0.0322*** 0.0473*** 0.0437*** 
 (0.0120) (0.0233) (0.0231) (0.0092) (0.0175) (0.0147) 
       
    250-499 -0.0789*** -0.0706*** -0.1000*** 0.0741*** 0.0694*** 0.0930*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0254) (0.0253) (0.0115) (0.0197) (0.0163) 
       
    500-999 -0.1172*** -0.0956*** -0.0879*** 0.0943*** 0.0970*** 0.0969*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0254) (0.0305) (0.0104) (0.0182) (0.0187) 
       
    >=1000 -0.1376*** -0.1483*** -0.1549*** 0.1314*** 0.1162*** 0.1524*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0239) (0.0289) (0.0134) (0.0253) (0.0222) 
       
Experienceb -0.0097** -0.0070 -0.0085 0.0155*** 0.0145*** 0.0044 
 (0.0041) (0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0026) (0.0042) (0.0040) 
       
Trend 0.0081*** 0.0113*** 0.0107*** -0.0069*** -0.0036 -0.0015 
 (0.0014) (0.0034) (0.0028) (0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0027) 
       
CCBc -0.0237* -0.0395** -0.0277 -0.0155 0.0196 -0.0100 
 (0.0128) (0.0181) (0.0184) (0.0136) (0.0207) (0.0184) 
       
Early Adopter  -0.0550*** -0.1080***  0.0814*** 0.1190*** 
  (0.0204) (0.0180)  (0.0135) (0.0153) 
       
Constant 0.3224*** 0.3325*** 0.3469*** 0.2615*** 0.1755*** 0.1643*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0338) (0.0293) (0.0168) (0.0232) (0.0228) 
N 36,847 10,935 11,174 85,729 20,098 24,719 
R2 0.014 0.026 0.027 0.014 0.021 0.032 
 
Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the CRD level. The coefficients were estimated using ordinary 
least squares. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
† Dependent Variable: indicator variable equal to one if farmer applied glyphosate product at the historical 
usage rate of 32 oz/acre. Sample includes 3.7, 4, 4.17, and 5 lb/gal. products.   
§ Dependent Variable: indicator variable equal to one if farmer applied glyphosate product at 0.75 lb/acre. 
Sample includes 3.7, 4, 4.17, 4.5, and 5 lb/gal. products.   
aThe reference category is (<100 acres). 
bEqual to the number of years since a farmer first adopted a particular concentration. 
cThe Central Corn Belt (CCB) includes IL, IN, IA, and the southern CRDs in WI and MN. 
dRestricted to farms originally sampled in 2001. Early adopters are farms that used Roundup UltraMax in 
2001. 
eRestricted to farms originally sampled in 2003. Early adopters are farms that used Roundup WeatherMAX in 
2003. 
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Table 8. Summary Statistics for “Rationally Attentive” Individuals and “Everyone Else”, 2003-2011 
 
 
“Rationally 
Attentive” “Everyone Else” Difference† 
Application Rate 0.818 0.843 -0.025*** 
 (0.232) (0.284)  
3D   0.391 0.464 0.074*** 
 (0.488) (0.499)  
3.7D   0.0673 0.0667 -0.001  
(0.251) (0.250)  
4D   0.0708 0.0771 0.006**  
(0.257) (0.267)  
4.17D   0.0229 0.0456 0.023*** 
(0.150) (0.209)  
4.5D   0.443 0.340 -0.104*** 
(0.497) (0.474)  
5D   0.0052 0.0068 0.002* 
 (0.072) (0.082)  
Price 10.55 9.507 -1.045*** 
 (5.390) (5.006)  
Corn 0.424 0.470 0.046*** 
 (0.494) (0.499)  
Pre-plant 0.222 0.247 0.0248*** 
 (0.416) (0.431)  
Generic 0.427 0.527 0.100*** 
 (0.495) (0.499)  
No-Till 0.447 0.465 0.019*** 
 (0.497) (0.499)  
Acres Grown Range    
    <100 0.096 0.152 0.056*** 
 (0.295) (0.359)  
    100-249 0.191 0.233 0.042*** 
 (0.393) (0.423)  
    250-499 0.249 0.221 -0.028*** 
 (0.433) (0.415)  
    500-999 0.251 0.216 -0.036*** 
 (0.434) (0.411)  
    >=1,000 0.212 0.179 -0.034*** 
 (0.409) (0.383)  
Observations 9,119 132,065  
 
†Statistical significance of t-test for difference between means: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 9. Regression Results of “Rationally Attentive” Growers and “Everyone Else” 
 
 “Rationally Attentive” † “Everyone Else”  Difference
3.7D   0.0719
*** 0.1232*** -0.0513* 
 (0.0279) (0.0083) (0.0288) 
    
4D   0.1088
*** 0.1525*** -0.0437** 
 (0.0179) (0.0074) (0.0188) 
    
4.17D   0.0905
*** 0.1392*** -0.0487* 
 (0.0277) (0.0092) (0.0283) 
    
4.5D   0.1701
*** 0.2490*** -0.0789*** 
 (0.0210) (0.0073) (0.0234) 
    
5D   0.0986
*** 0.2976*** -0.1990*** 
 (0.0236) (0.0214) (0.0303) 
    
Price -0.0033** -0.0037*** 0.0004 
 (0.0014) (0.0005) (0.0015) 
    
Corn -0.0208*** -0.0099*** -0.0109 
 (0.0061) (0.0026) (0.0066) 
    
Pre-Plant -0.0369*** -0.0239*** -0.0129 
 (0.0112) (0.0042) (0.0101) 
    
Generic 0.0435** 0.0345*** 0.0090 
 (0.0215) (0.0061) (0.0232) 
    
No-till -0.0079 0.0037 -0.0117 
 (0.0077) (0.0026) (0.0083) 
 
N = 141,184. R2 = 0.5224. Dependent Variable: Application Rate (lb/acre/treatment). There are 
9,119 rationally attentive observations and 132,065 observations for everyone else. Standard errors, 
in parentheses, are clustered at the CRD level. All regressions include farmer-specific and time fixed 
effects. The coefficients were estimated using the Stata reghdfe package, based on the fixed effects 
estimator in Correia (2016).  * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
† The results in this column were obtained by summing the “Everyone Else” and Difference column 
coefficients, which were obtained using a pooled regression. Standard errors computed using the 
delta method.  
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Table 10. Predicted Glyphosate Quantity and Expenditures in U.S. Corn and Soybeans for Three 
Different Scenarios, 2003-2011 
 
 ---Total Quantity (millions of lbs)--- ---Total Cost ($ million)--- 
Year 
Status 
Quo 
All 
Rationally 
Attentive 
No 
Concentration 
Effect 
Status 
Quo 
All 
Rationally 
Attentive 
No 
Concentration 
Effect 
2003 90 87 79 1,539 1,474 1,331 
2004 100 97 89 1,387 1,327 1,196 
2005 107 103 94 1,173 1,122 1,014 
2006 110 106 97 1,064 1,018 921 
2007 131 126 115 1,076 1,030 929 
2008 163 155 138 1,726 1,639 1,450 
2009 164 157 142 1,862 1,776 1,582 
2010 176 169 153 1,096 1,046 932 
2011 181 172 151 858 812 709 
Mean 136 130 117 1,309 1,250 1,118 
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Appendix A – Additional Content 
 
Online Agricultural Forums 
There are numerous online agricultural forums in which farmers post questions and comments about 
various farming practices and products. Some of these posts provide insights into farmers’ knowledge 
and perceptions of glyphosate products. Farmers commonly post questions about glyphosate 
application rates, glyphosate prices, and generic glyphosate products. Some examples of forum threads 
on these issues that we perused are listed below. 
Forum References: 
AgTalk, 2009. “Any user’s of Durango herbicide by DOW”. Accessed 28 May 2018, 
https://talk.newagtalk.com/forums/thread-view.asp?tid=115798&DisplayType=flat&setCookie=1 
 
AgTalk, 2010. “Roundup Price”. Accessed 28 May 2018, https://talk.newagtalk.com/forums/thread-
view.asp?tid=184650&DisplayType=flat. 
 
Bowsite, 2009. “Anything as good as Round-up but cheaper”. Accessed 28 May 2018, 
https://forums.bowsite.com/tf/bgforums/thread.cfm?forum=4&threadid=375821 
 
Data Description 
This section provides some additional details about the data. As noted, we observe multiple years for 
many farmers but the sample is not balanced. Each year, some farmers happen to be resampled by 
chance. Table A2 contains the distribution of sampled years. Recall that there are 31,417 different 
farmers observed. About 50% of these farmers were surveyed just once, 20.5% were surveyed twice, 
11% were surveyed three times, and so on. Just seven farmers were surveyed for all fourteen years. 
Nonetheless, a substantial number of farmers were surveyed multiple years (over 9,000 were surveyed 
for at least three years).    
 A farm-year is a particular farm observed in a particular year. In total, we observe 72,319 farm-
years (this can be computed from Table A2 by summing over the product of the number of farmers 
and how many years they were sampled). The unit of observation in our study is an application of a 
specific glyphosate product to a specific field at a specific stage in the planting process. A field is 
defined by the type of seed planted, the type of tillage employed, and the sequence of herbicide 
products used. Some examples are as follows. If a farmer plants no-till corn and no-till soybeans and 
applies Roundup UltraMax once to each crop, they would contribute two observations to the data. A 
farmer that applies the same product on the same field once pre-emergence and once post-emergence 
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would also contribute two observations (i.e., applications).  Given that are 184,782 observations, the 
average number of applications per farm-year is 2.56. Table A3 contains the distribution of 
applications per farm-year. About 40% of farm-years applied glyphosate a single time. The vast 
majority (~87%) of farm-years administered four or fewer applications of glyphosate. Largely owing 
to the many different types of seed planted, some farmers contributed in excess of 15 observations, 
with a maximum of 48. 
 A separate tendency of interest is how often a farmer used two different concentrations within 
the same year. Table A4 contains this distribution. Nearly 95% of farm-years used a single 
concentration, 5% used two concentrations, and just 72 used three or more in the same year. Thus, it 
is relatively rare for a farmer to use multiple concentrations within the same year. However, it’s 
relatively common for an individual to use different concentrations over time. Table A5 tabulates the 
number of different concentrations and the number of years sampled for each of the 31,417 sampled 
farms. Of the 15,704 farms that were surveyed for just a single year, 14,974 used a single concentration. 
Of the 6,434 surveyed twice, over 2,900 used at least two different concentrations. More generally, 
about a third of farms used at least two concentrations (36 farms tried each of all five different 
concentrations at some point).  
 
Robustness Checks 
As noted, we include year fixed effects to control for the impact of nationwide changes in weed 
resistance and output prices. Weed resistance does, and prices may also, vary spatially. Thus, as part 
of robustness checks we estimate specifications with four additional sets of controls. Table A6 
contains results for each of these specifications. In the model reported in column (a) year fixed effects 
are replaced with state-year fixed effects. In the model reported in column (b), year fixed effects are 
supplemented with CRD-specific quadratic time trends. In the model of column (c) year fixed effects 
are maintained, and we add a set of dummy variables for glyphosate resistant weed species. Specifically, 
we include dummy variables for whether a farmer targeted a glyphosate resistant weed, i.e., a weed 
known to have developed resistance as identified by the International Survey of Herbicide Resistant 
Weeds.20 Finally, in column (d) we include a variable that contains the count of how many glyphosate 
resistant weeds were targeted on a field. 
                                                 
20 See Heap, I. (2017), The International Survey of Herbicide Resistant Weeds. Available at 
www.weedscience.org. The eight weeds we add dummies for are Pigweed, Ragweed, Waterhemp, 
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By including additional sets of spatial and time varying controls, we seek to control for the 
possibility that output prices and weed pressure were correlated with the adoption of higher 
concentrated products and application rates, eliminating any bias that would result in the estimated 
concentration coefficients.  The results of Table A6 make it clear that the estimated concentration 
effects from the baseline models of Table 5 are very robust. Note that, to save space, Table A6 only 
reports robustness checks for the “dummy variable” specification of the concentration effect. 
Estimates for the “linear” specification of the concentration effect, not reported here, were equally 
robust.   
Per the suggestions of the editor and referees, we conducted eight additional robustness 
checks, which are presented in Table A7. From left to right, these robustness checks: (1) remove price, 
(2) remove possibly endogenous controls, (3) remove the generic dummy, (4-5) estimate separate 
models for generic and non-generic products, (6) estimate the model with pre-plant rates only, (7) 
remove 1% application rate outliers, and (8) remove 1% application rate outliers and price. While there 
are some small changes in the magnitudes of the concentration coefficients across these specifications, 
compared to the baseline results in column 2 of Table 5, the general pattern is largely the same. 
 
Regressions with the Concentration Level as the Dependent Variable 
To gain further insights into the factors associated with choosing a particular concentration level we 
estimate linear and ordered logit models with the chosen concentration level as the dependent variable. 
The estimation results for these regressions are provided in Table A8. The results indicate that larger 
operations are more likely to use more concentrated products and higher yielding regions are more 
likely to used more concentrated products. We also include state dummy variables to see whether 
there were clear geographic differences in chosen concentration levels. There is some evidence that 
farmers in more northern states such as IA, IL, MN, and the Dakotas tended to purchase more 
concentrated products. However, results for WI and MI are not consistent with this tendency. Column 
3 of Table A8 estimates the linear concentration level model as a function of the range of acres planted, 
but in contrast to the other models, also includes farm fixed effects. When these effects are included 
the acres planted variables all become insignificant, with the exception of the dummy variable for 
                                                 
Horseweed, Kochia, Johnsongrass, and Thistle. In some cases, the listed weed may encompass 
multiple related individual species (for example, “Ragweed” includes both Common Ragweed and 
Giant Ragweed). 
42 
 
operations exceeding 1,000 acres. This is mainly due to the lack of within-farm variation in the acres 
planted variables. 
 
Summary Statistics for 32 oz/acre and 0.75 lb/acre Application Choices 
This section provides additional details about the indicator variables for the 32 oz/acre and 0.75 
lb/acre dosing choices. For the each of the two dummy variables, Table A9 presents the mean, overall 
standard deviation, between standard deviation and within standard deviation. Between standard 
deviation measures the variation of the indicator variables between farms, whereas within standard 
deviation measures the variation within farms. For both dosing choices, the between farmer variation 
exceeded the within variation, though slightly more so for the 32 oz/acre variable. This suggests the 
presence of time-invariant farm-level heterogeneity: some farms have a relatively higher propensity to 
regularly use  32 oz/acre or 0.75 lb/acre. 
 To get a sense of how frequently a farmer switched between options, we also compute 
transition probabilities (Table A10). To compute these probabilities, we drop 4.5 lb/gal product 
observations (so the 32 oz/acre variable and 0.75 lb/acre variable could be collapsed into one variable) 
and convert the data to a single observation per farm per year. Concerning the latter, a farmer is coded 
as using 32 oz/acre if we observe at least one occurrence in a particular year, or instead as using 0.75 
lb/acre if we observe at least one occurrence in a specific year.  We drop the small number of cases 
(~2.6% of farm-years) where both occurrences happened in the same year. The transition matrix 
implies that if a farmer is observed in year t  using neither 0.75 lb/acre nor 32 oz/acre, then the next 
time they are observed they have a ~51% chance of continuing to use neither, a ~18% chance of 
switching to 0.75 lb/acre, and ~31% chance of switching to 32 oz/acre. The main result that emerges 
from these probabilities is that there is some degree of persistent heterogeneity among farmers in their 
propensity to use certain types of rates. For example, conditional on using 32 oz/acre in year t, a 
farmer had an ~51% chance of applying at 32 oz/acre in the future, which is significantly greater than 
the ~23% for farmers that apply 0.75 lb/acre. On the other hand, farmers that apply 0.75 lb/acre in 
period t  are relatively more likely to continue doing so in the future (~40% versus ~15% for 32 
oz/acre appliers).  
 
Glyphosate Firm Shares, Firm Prices, and Glyphosate Product Availability 
Some firms only produce and sell certain concentration levels. Table A12 presents glyphosate firm 
shares for the three largest glyphosate firms – Dow AgroSciences, Monsanto, and Syngenta – as well 
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for an “Other” category that includes all other glyphosate firms. In terms of products with more than 
3 lb/gal of glyphosate, Monsanto sold all 3.7 lb/gal products and nearly all 4.5 lb/gal products (there 
were a small number of non-Monsanto 4.5 lb/gal products sold from 2004 on). Products with 4 lb/gal 
were sold by Dow, Monsanto, and other smaller companies, with Dow dominating this space by the 
2008-2011 period. Syngenta sold 100% of 4.17 and 5 lb/gal products. Some of the implications of 
firm specialization were investigated with robustness checks in columns 4 and 5 of Table A7. There 
we estimate separate models for Monsanto products and generic products. While the concentration 
coefficients differ in cases where both Monsanto and generic products were sold under the same 
concentration, both indicate positive and significant effects of concentration on application rates.  
 In Table A13, we also report overall quantity market shares by major glyphosate firm over 
time.  The largest change occurred for Monsanto, which held over 83% of market share in the 2000-
2003 time interval, and just over 48% of market share in the 2008-2011 time interval. Firms with the 
greatest penetration included Dow AgroSciences, Syngenta, and Tenkoz. Table A14 presents U.S. 
average nominal glyphosate prices by major glyphosate firm over time. Monsanto regularly charged a 
premium of $2.00 to $4.00 per lb for their products, with the premium falling over time. Syngenta 
priced their products below Monsanto but at $1.00 to $2.00 above other companies.  
 As suggested by the editor, we also explored the issue of geographic availability of glyphosate 
products over time. In the data, we observe where products were purchased but this is an imperfect 
signal of where products were available, primarily because certain regions are sampled infrequently, 
and certain products are purchased infrequently. Table A15 provides a count of how many states each 
concentration was purchased in over time. For some concentrations, a large number of states were 
not sampled. Upon further investigation, we found that it was usually the case that these states had 
very few observations; i.e., they had very little acreage in corn and soybeans. In other cases, such as 
for 5 lb/gal concentrated products, it seemed more likely that it was simply an infrequently purchased 
concentration. Overall, we know of no reasons for some glyphosate products to not be generally 
available in all locations, especially in view of the competitive pressure brought about by the expiration 
of Monsanto’s patent.   
 
Switching 
In addition to using different concentrations, some farmers switch back and forth between high and 
low concentration products. The unbalanced nature of the panel makes it difficult to analyze this 
switching in a simple way, but some basic numbers are as follows. Of the 31,417 sampled farms, 8,737 
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purchased a high concentration product – a product with a concentration level higher than 3 lb/gal – 
and were sampled at least one additional year subsequent to their first purchase of that high 
concentration product. Of these 8,737 respondents, nearly 56% (4,871) switched back to a low 
concentration product at some point in the future. Of those 4,871 switchers, 3,037 were sampled at 
least one additional year subsequent to switching back to a 3 lb product. Of that number, 2,039, or 
67%, switched back again to high concentration product. Proceeding in a similar fashion, 1,183 of 
2,039 remained in the sample, and of these 1,183, 627 (53%) switched back again at some point to a 
low concentration product. A total of 289 farmers were observed switching four times: high – low – 
high – low – high; and a total of 25 farmers were observed switching six times: high – low – high – 
low – high – low – high.  
 We further explore whether farmers that switch are different from other farmers by comparing 
the 2,039 farmers that switch from high to low and back to high again to all other farmers that were 
sampled at least three times. Table A16 reports the concentration regressions for each group. Overall, 
the differences are not large, with farmers that switch having slightly smaller concentration 
coefficients. The most noticeable difference is that the magnitude of the price coefficient for switchers 
is larger, as would be expected.  
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Appendix B – Additional Figures 
 
Figure A1. Application Rate Histograms by Concentration Level Over Time 
3 lb/gal Products 
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4 lb/gal Glyphosate Products  
 
4.17 lb/gal Glyphosate Products 
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4.5 lb/gal Glyphosate Products 
 
5 lb/gal Glyphosate Products 
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Figure A2. Geographical Distribution for “Rationally Attentive” farmers (fraction of respondents) 
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Appendix C – Additional Tables 
 
 
Table A1. Annual Weeds Rate Tables from Selected Glyphosate Product Labels 
 
Roundup Ultra (3 lb/gal) 
 
 RATE 
(fluid ounces per acre) 
 16 24 32 40 48 
WEED SPECIES Maximum height/length (in inches) 
Barnyardgrass - 3” 6” 7” 9” 
Cocklebur 12” 18” 24” - 36” 
Ragweed, giant - 6” 12” - 18” 
 
 
Buccaneer Plus (3 lb/gal) 
 
 RATE 
(fluid ounces per acre) 
 16 24 32 40 48 
WEED SPECIES Maximum height/length (in inches) 
Barnyardgrass - 3” 6” 7” 9” 
Cocklebur 12” 18” 24” - 36” 
Ragweed, giant - 6” 12” - 18” 
 
 
GlyStar® Plus (3 lb/gal) 
 
 RATE 
(fluid ounces per acre) 
 16 24 32 40 48 
WEED SPECIES Maximum height/length (in inches) 
Barnyardgrass - 3” 6” 7” 9” 
Cocklebur 12” 18” 24” - 36” 
Ragweed, giant - 6” 12” - 18” 
 
 
Roundup UltraMAX (3.7 lb/gal) 
 
 RATE 
(fluid ounces per acre) 
 13 20 26 32 40 
WEED SPECIES Maximum height/length (in inches) 
Barnyardgrass - 3” 6” 7” 9” 
Cocklebur 12” 18” 24” - 36” 
Ragweed, giant - 6” 12” - 18” 
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Durango® DMA® (4 lb/gal) 
 
 RATE 
(fluid ounces per acre) 
 12 18 24 30 36 
WEED SPECIES Maximum height/length (in inches) 
Barnyardgrass - 3” 6” 7” 9” 
Cocklebur 12” 18” 24” - 36” 
Ragweed, giant - 6” 12” - 18” 
 
 
Touchdown Total (4.17 lb/gal) 
 
 RATE 
(fluid ounces per acre) 
 Maximum Weed (height/length) 
WEED SPECIES 3” 6” 12” 18” 24” 
Barnyardgrass 24 24 35 - - 
Cocklebur - - 12 17 24 
Ragweed, giant - 17 24 35 - 
 
 
Roundup WeatherMAX (4.5 lb/gal) 
 
 RATE 
(fluid ounces per acre) 
 11 16 22 27 32 
WEED SPECIES Maximum height/length (in inches) 
Barnyardgrass - 3” 6” 7” 9” 
Cocklebur 12” 18” 24” - 36” 
Ragweed, giant - 6” 12” - 18” 
 
 
Touchdown HiTech® (5 lb/gal) 
 
 RATE 
(fluid ounces per acre) 
 Maximum Weed (height/length) 
WEED SPECIES 3” 6” 12” 18” 24” 
Barnyardgrass 20 20 30 - - 
Cocklebur - - 10 14 20 
Ragweed, giant - 14 20 30 - 
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Table A2. Distribution of Years in Sample 
Number of 
Years in 
Sample Farmers Percent 
1 15,704 49.99 
2 6,434 20.48 
3 3,429 10.91 
4 2,107 6.71 
5 1,311 4.17 
6 869 2.77 
7 573 1.82 
8 376 1.2 
9 237 0.75 
10 175 0.56 
11 110 0.35 
12 52 0.17 
13 33 0.11 
14 7 0.02 
 
 
Table A3. Distribution of Number of Applications per Farm-Year 
Applications Farm-Years Percent 
1 29,090 40.22 
2 18,652 25.79 
3 9,281 12.83 
4 6,176 8.54 
5 2,830 3.91 
6 2,425 3.35 
7 1,036 1.43 
8 952 1.32 
9 500 0.69 
10 451 0.62 
11 215 0.3 
12 235 0.32 
13 98 0.14 
14 107 0.15 
>=15 271 0.37 
Max is 48 applications. 
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Table A4. Distribution of Number of different Concentrations Used in Same Year 
Number of 
Concentrations 
Farm-
Years Percent 
1 68,519 94.75 
2 3,728 5.15 
3 70 0.1 
4 2 0 
 
 
Table A5. Tabulation of Years Sampled and Different Concentrations Used 
 ---Different Concentrations Used---  
Sampled Years 1 2 3 4 5 Farms 
1 14,974 719 10 1 0 15,704 
2 3,467 2,793 170 4 0 6,434 
3 1,242 1,645 524 18 0 3,429 
4 510 1,027 525 44 1 2,107 
5 215 601 425 65 5 1,311 
6 121 322 354 68 4 869 
7 38 191 259 81 4 573 
8 22 115 174 62 3 376 
9 14 56 119 43 5 237 
10 5 31 88 44 7 175 
11 6 15 64 21 4 110 
12 2 12 25 10 3 52 
13 2 3 16 12 0 33 
14 0 1 2 4 0 7 
Total 20,618 7,531 2,755 477 36 31,417 
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Table A6. Impact of Product Concentration on Glyphosate Use: Robustness Checks 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
3.7D   0.1060
*** 0.1055*** 0.1063*** 0.1064*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0056) 
     
4D   0.1423
*** 0.1435*** 0.1451*** 0.1451*** 
 (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0068) 
     
4.17D   0.1324
*** 0.1315*** 0.1315*** 0.1316*** 
 (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0085) (0.0085) 
     
4.5D   0.2260
*** 0.2244*** 0.2248*** 0.2251*** 
 (0.0060) (0.0058) (0.0060) (0.0060) 
     
5D   0.2785
*** 0.2781*** 0.2761*** 0.2765*** 
 (0.0197) (0.0210) (0.0197) (0.0198) 
     
Price -0.0034*** -0.0034*** -0.0034*** -0.0034*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
     
Corn -0.0092*** -0.0084*** -0.0082*** -0.0082*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
     
Pre-plant -0.0258*** -0.0258*** -0.0246*** -0.0245*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0027) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
     
Generic 0.0308*** 0.0289*** 0.0291*** 0.0292*** 
 (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0052) 
     
No-till 0.0016 0.0010 0.0020 0.0019 
 (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
     
Resistant Weed Count    0.0059*** 
    (0.0016) 
CONTROLS     
Year fixed effects -- Yes Yes Yes 
State-year fixed effects Yes -- -- -- 
CRD-specific quadratic 
trends -- Yes -- -- 
Weed-specific dummies -- -- Yes Yes 
R2 0.494 0.495 0.489 0.489 
Dependent Variable: Application Rate (lb/acre/treatment). Standard errors, in parentheses, are 
clustered at the CRD level. All regressions include farmer-specific and time fixed effects.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A7. Additional Robustness Checks 
 
Remove 
Price 
Remove 
Controls 
Remove 
Generic 
Variable 
Monsanto 
Products 
Only 
Generic 
Products 
Only 
Pre-Plant 
Choices 
Only 
Drop 1% 
Outliers 
Drop 1% 
Outliers 
& Price 
3.7D   0.1080
*** 0.0874*** 0.0917*** 0.1058*** -- 0.0916*** 0.0959*** 0.0971*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0062)  (0.0131) (0.0040) (0.0040) 
         
4D   0.1478
*** 0.1514*** 0.1470*** 0.1076*** 0.1668*** 0.1489*** 0.1351*** 0.1372*** 
 (0.0069) (0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0211) (0.0093) (0.0141) (0.0058) (0.0059) 
         
4.17D   0.1320
*** 0.1375*** 0.1350*** -- 0.1522*** 0.1088*** 0.1331*** 0.1335*** 
 (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0086)  (0.0100) (0.0189) (0.0079) (0.0080) 
         
4.5D   0.2288
*** 0.1990*** 0.2038*** 0.2262*** 0.1610*** 0.2052*** 0.2047*** 0.2074*** 
 (0.0060) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0074) (0.0464) (0.0124) (0.0046) (0.0045) 
         
5D   0.2812
*** 0.2879*** 0.2799*** -- 0.3131*** 0.2409*** 0.2486*** 0.2523*** 
 (0.0197) (0.0196) (0.0197)  (0.0222) (0.0371) (0.0190) (0.0190) 
         
Corn -0.0084*** -- -0.0088*** -0.0072** -0.0095*** 0.0020 -0.0080*** -0.0078***
 (0.0024)  (0.0024) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0054) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
         
Generic 0.0411*** -- -- -- -- 0.0213** 0.0307*** 0.0398*** 
 (0.0051)     (0.0105) (0.0040) (0.0038) 
         
Pre-Plant -0.0251*** -- -0.0251*** -0.0236*** -0.0263*** -- -0.0252*** -0.0251***
 (0.0043)  (0.0043) (0.0053) (0.0044)  (0.0038) (0.0038) 
         
No-till 0.0020 -- 0.0019 0.0028 -0.0019 0.0006 0.0007 0.0008 
 (0.0023)  (0.0023) (0.0032) (0.0036) (0.0050) (0.0018) (0.0017) 
         
Price -- -- -0.0039*** -0.0033*** -0.0038*** -0.0029*** -0.0026*** -- 
   (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0003)  
N 184,782 184,782 184,782 108,032 76,750 49,388 180,854 180,854 
R2 0.488 0.486 0.488 0.532 0.571 0.613 0.540 0.539 
Dependent Variable: Application Rate (lb/acre/treatment) Standard errors, in parentheses, are 
clustered at the CRD level. All regressions include farmer-specific and time fixed effects. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table A8. Concentration Regression Results (dependent variable is the chosen concentration level) 
 Linear Model 
Ordered Logit 
Model 
Fixed Effects 
Linear Model 
Acres Grown Range    
    100-249 0.0154*** 0.0514*** -0.0083 
    250-499 0.0306*** 0.0925*** 0.0010 
    500-999 0.0510*** 0.1541*** 0.0104 
    >=1000 0.1048*** 0.3085*** 0.0307*** 
Soybean Yield 0.0063*** 0.0182***  
Corn Yield 0.0015*** 0.0046***  
AR -0.0718*** -0.1755***  
IA 0.0779*** 0.2401***  
IL 0.0907*** 0.2809***  
IN -0.0026 0.0227  
KS 0.0074 0.0160  
KY 0.0029 0.0273  
MI -0.0344*** -0.0831**  
MN 0.1065*** 0.3245***  
MO 0.0006 0.0288  
MS -0.0614*** -0.1827***  
NC 0.0075 0.0185  
ND 0.1213*** 0.3935***  
NE -0.0117 -0.0182  
OH 0.0168* 0.0882***  
PA -0.0199 -0.0440  
SD 0.2112*** 0.6492***  
TN -0.0650*** -0.2006***  
WI -0.0187* -0.0326  
Constant 3.0287***  3.5711*** 
Observations 179,529 179,529 184,782 
R2 0.036 0.0147 0.5918 
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Table A9. Summary Statistics for 32 oz/acre and 0.75 lb/acre Application Choices 
 --Applied 32 oz/acre-- --Applied 0.75 lb/acre-- 
 Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
Overall 0.3017 0.4590 0.2989 0.4578 
Between  0.4215 0.3752 
Within  0.2649 0.3011 
 Observations = 36,847 Observations = 85,729 
 Farmers = 10,823 Farmers = 17,454 
 
 
Table A10. Probability Transition Matrix for 32 oz/acre and 0.75 lb/acre Application Choices 
 Neither 
Applied 
0.75 lb/acre
Applied 32 
oz/acre 
  
Neither 51.38 17.65 30.97 
Applied 0.75 lb/acre 36.92 40.21 22.87 
Applied 32 oz/acre 34.11 14.58 51.31 
  
Total 42.21 22.28 35.51 
Note: Entries are in percent (sum to 100 row-wise). 
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Table A11. Regression Results of “Rationally Attentive” Growers and “Everyone Else” (Roundup 
WeatherMAX in 2003 and 2004 was used as an indicator of rational attention) 
 
 “Rationally Attentive” † “Everyone Else” Difference
3.7D   0.1178
** 0.1223*** -0.0045 
 (0.0456) (0.0114) (0.0492) 
    
4D   0.1070
*** 0.1569*** -0.0500** 
 (0.0214) (0.0082) (0.0222) 
    
4.17D   0.0791
*** 0.1441*** -0.0650*** 
 (0.0226) (0.0098) (0.0250) 
    
4.5D   0.2035
*** 0.2601*** -0.0566** 
 (0.0249) (0.0083) (0.0265) 
    
5D   0.0908
* 0.2959*** -0.2051*** 
 (0.0504) (0.0220) (0.0570) 
    
Price -0.0017 -0.0034*** 0.0018 
 (0.0016) (0.0006) (0.0017) 
    
Corn -0.0250*** -0.0113*** -0.0136 
 (0.0084) (0.0027) (0.0087) 
    
Pre-Plant -0.0422*** -0.0234*** -0.0188 
 (0.0118) (0.0045) (0.0124) 
    
Generic 0.0610** 0.0430*** 0.0180 
 (0.0263) (0.0075) (0.0280) 
    
No-till -0.0292*** 0.0044* -0.0337*** 
 (0.0108) (0.0026) (0.0112) 
 
N = 116,483. R2 = 0.5531. Dependent Variable: Application Rate (lb/acre/treatment). There are 
6,463 rationally attentive observations and 110,020 observations for everyone else. Standard errors, 
in parentheses, are clustered at the CRD level. All regressions include farmer-specific and time fixed 
effects. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
† The results in this column were obtained by summing the “Everyone Else” and Difference column 
coefficients, which were obtained using a pooled regression. Standard errors computed using the 
delta method.  
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Table A12. Quantity Market Share by Product Concentration Level and Glyphosate Firm 
 Concentration Dow AgroSciences Monsanto Syngenta Other 
2000-
2003 
3 7.8 48.4 8.1 35.7 
3.7 -- 100 -- -- 
4 -- 66.6 -- 33.4 
4.17 -- -- 100 -- 
4.5 -- 100 -- -- 
5 -- -- 100 -- 
2004-
2007 
3 2.6 18.0 5.6 73.8 
3.7 -- 100 -- -- 
4 83.5 9.9 -- 6.6 
4.17 -- -- 100 -- 
4.5 -- 99.9 -- 0.1 
5 -- -- 100 -- 
2008-
2011 
3 0.3 3.8 4.1 91.8 
3.7 -- 100 -- -- 
4 89.6 -- -- 10.4 
4.17 -- -- 100 -- 
4.5 -- 99.8 -- 0.2 
5 -- -- 100 -- 
 
 
Table A13. Quantity Market Share by Glyphosate Firm and Year Interval 
Company 2000-2003 2004-2007 2008-2011 
Albaugh Chemical 1.24 5.68 5.23 
Cheminova 1.19 2.53 3.64 
Dow AgroSciences 2.99 5.01 10.25 
Monsanto 83.84 55.66 48.16 
Syngenta 3.61 5.44 9.53 
Tenkoz 0.67 6.99 8.37 
Winfield Solutions 0.32 3.05 5.33 
Other 6.13 15.64 9.49 
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Table A14. Nominal Mean U.S. Glyphosate Price ($/lb ae) by Glyphosate Firm and Year Interval 
Company 2000-2003 2004-2007 2008-2011 
Albaugh Chemical 7.17 5.22 6.11 
Cheminova 8.31 5.24 6.26 
Dow AgroSciences 9.44 5.79 5.75 
Monsanto 12.15 8.71 8.45 
Syngenta 10.95 7.37 7.27 
Tenkoz 8.25 5.56 6.44 
Winfield Solutions 8.12 6.03 6.64 
Other 8.11 5.35 6.34 
 
 
Table A15. State Counts with Observed Purchases by Product Concentration Level 
 Product Concentration Level (lb/gal)  
Year 3 3.7 4 4.17 4.5 5 
Sampled 
States 
1998 43  11 43 
1999 43  22 43 
2000 45 16 18 45 
2001 45 36 22 45 
2002 43 41 21 1 45 
2003 41 43 23 34 45 
2004 42 38 20 16 38 8 47 
2005 34 32 24 17 33 19 34 
2006 34 31 20 17 33 15 34 
2007 34 32 23 21 34 15 34 
2008 34 33 19 21 33 19 34 
2009 34 27 19 25 33 13 34 
2010 34  22 28 34 14 34 
2011 34  23 27 34 14 34 
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Table A16. Estimated Results for Users Identified as Switchers and as Non-Switchers 
 Switchers Non-Switchers 
3.7D   0.0994
*** 0.1071*** 
 (0.0096) (0.0084) 
   
4D   0.1417
*** 0.1437*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0092) 
   
4.17D   0.1156
*** 0.1402*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0120) 
   
4.5D   0.2198
*** 0.2259*** 
 (0.0094) (0.0097) 
   
5D   0.2673
*** 0.2902*** 
 (0.0364) (0.0256) 
   
Price -0.0044*** -0.0034*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0005) 
   
Corn -0.0147*** -0.0095*** 
 (0.0042) (0.0031) 
   
Pre-plant -0.0390*** -0.0234*** 
 (0.0068) (0.0046) 
   
Generic 0.0325*** 0.0262*** 
 (0.0093) (0.0080) 
   
No-till 0.0018 0.0009 
 (0.0059) (0.0030) 
N 36,710 79,615 
R2 0.355 0.412 
Dependent Variable: Application Rate (lb/acre/treatment). Standard errors, in parentheses, are 
clustered at the CRD level. All regressions include farmer-specific and time fixed effects. * p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
